This post from internal NSA newsletter SIDToday dated 19 November 2003 provides an early description of FAIRVIEW and STORMBREW, later known as Upstream collection: see the Intercept article Iraqi Insurgents Stymied the NSA and Other Highlights from 263 Internal Agency Reports, 10 August 2016.

This 28 October 2009 post from the internal NSA newsletter SSO Weekly discusses the construction of a cable landing station that matches Verizon’s activities at that time: see the New York Times article AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, 15 August 2015.

This NSA report dated 11 April 2014 describes the difficulties with the network switches the agency had compromised on Cisco devices in order to collect data from Cisco customers: see the book No Place To Hide, 13 May 2014.

Excerpts from slides describing GHOSTMACHINE, the NSA Special Source Operations cloud-based analytics platform: see the Washington Post article New documents show how the NSA infers relationships based on mobile location data, 10 December 2013.

This excerpt from the 14 March 2013 edition of internal NSA newsletter SSO Weekly describes an incident on 12 March where “unwitting” contractors discovered a cable tap known as WHARPDRIVE, which had to be discreetly reinstalled and provides details about the Breckenridge access point that corroborate the identification of the NSA’s corporate partner STORMBREW as […]

This undated NSA Special Source Operations presentation describes the agency’s relationship with corporate partner AT&T, codenamed FAIRVIEW: see the New York Times article AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, 15 August 2015.

This NSA memo from 23 March 2012 presentation describes the agency’s proposal for a fourth FAA 702 certification that would allow it to target hackers “tied to malicious cyber activity”: see the New York Times article Hunting for Hackers, N.S.A. Secretly Expands Internet Spying at U.S. Border, 4 June 2015.

This NSA classification guide from 2004 outlines the sensitivity of various aspects of the agency’s WHIPGENIE relationships with US corporate partners: see the Intercept article Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany, 10 October 2014.

This undated presentation from the NSA’s Special Source Operations division shows that the agency’s ability to intercept key communications infrastructure is dependent on corporate relationships, several of which can be identified using information given in this document: see the Guardian article Snowden document reveals key role of companies in NSA data collection, 1 November 2013. […]

This NSA Special Source Operations presentation from 22 March 2013 supplies a detail about the Breckenridge access point that supports the identification of the corporate partner codenamed STORMBREW as US telecommunications company Verizon: see the New York Times article AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, 15 August 2015.

This undated NSA presentation, presented together with speaking notes, provides an introduction to the main cable access programmes facilitated by the agency’s corporate partners and specifies the relevant SIGADs: see the book No Place to Hide, 13 May 2014.