DocumentRelease Date: 2015-02-19 Document Date: 2010-01-01
This slide from a 2010 GCHQ presentation shows that the agency believed it had penetrated “the entire network” of GEMALTO, the world’s largest mobile SIM manufacturer: see the Intercept article The Great SIM Heist: How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle, 19 February 2015.
SECRET STRAP 1 CNE access to core mobile networks CNE access to core mobile networks - Billing servers to suppress SMS billing - Authentication servers to obtain K’s, Ki’s and OTA k...
DocumentRelease Date: 2015-06-22 Document Date: 2008-07-23
This GCHQ document, last updated on 23 July 2008, provides information about the agency’s systems for detecting network threats and authorisation procedures: see the Intercept article Spies Hacked Computers Thanks to Sweeping Secret Warrants, Aggressively Stretching U.K. Law, 22 June 2015.
SECRET STRAP1 Intrusion Analysis/JeAC The IA team conducts all-source analysis both of emerging and current electronic attack types. It forms part of the Joint Electronic Attack Cell (JeAC)...
DocumentRelease Date: 2015-06-22
This undated GCHQ training document details the requirements for analysts engaged in the reverse engineering of commercial antivirus software: see the Intercept article Popular Security Software Came Under Relentless NSA and GCHQ Attacks, 22 June 2015.
SECRET ACNO Skill 12: Malware Analysis & Reverse Engineering Knowledge of: • Relevant Operating Systems. • Current trends in attack vectors & targeted applications / protocols / services...
DocumentRelease Date: 2014-08-12 Document Date: 2010-06-28
These GCHQ guidelines from 23 June 2010 describe procedures for operating mobile phones overseas which are not intended to be associated with agency activity: see the Intercept article NPR Is Laundering CIA Talking Points to Make You Scared of NSA Reporting, 12 August 2014.
SECRET Ref: DOT/1636/5040/102 28 June 2010 OPA~TAS Covert Mobile Phones Policy Author: Issue 1.0 Page 1 of 6 SECRET This information is exempt from disclosure under the Fr...
DocumentRelease Date: 2016-06-07 Document Date: 2007-05-08
This GCHQ document dated 8 May 2007 provides technical information about PRESTON, the British system for intercepting the communications of targets under warrant: see the Intercept article Facing Data Deluge, Secret U.K. Spying Report Warned of Intelligence Failure, 7 June 2016.
SECRET STRAP 1 PRESTON Business Processes Sigmod/00003CPO/4502/SIG010900/23 8 May 2007 PRESTON Business Processes Version 1.0 Synopsis The purpose of this document is to present ...
DocumentRelease Date: 2017-09-23 Document Date: 2009-05-27
This page from GCHQ’s internal GCWiki, dated 27 May 2009 describes a system for querying mobile phone information acquired during port stops: see the Intercept article Airport Police Demanded An Activist’s Passwords. He Refused. Now He Faces Prison In The UK, 23 September 2017.
UK SECRET The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate content. For GCWiki help contact: webteam RUSSETT Support page PHANTOM PA...
DocumentRelease Date: 2016-06-07 Document Date: 2010-03-01
This extract from a February 2010 MI5 report conveys the difficulties the agency was encountering in making use of the huge quantity of data it was receiving from GCH see the Intercept article Facing Data Deluge, Secret U.K. Spying Report Warned of Intelligence Failure, 7 June 2016.
SECRET Figure 2 - Approximate coverage of targets (July 2009) Priority of investigation I I No. targets I I Email accounts I I Broadband intercepts I I Remote access 2010/11 i...
DocumentRelease Date: 2018-03-01
This undated GCHQ presentation, which includes speaking notes, outlines different techniques for contact chaining – moving from one contact to find all those associated with it: see the Intercept article How London’s 7/7 Bombings Led to “Unprecedented” Surveillance Tactics, 1 March 2018.
SECRET STRAP 1 Slide 15 © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under oth...
DocumentRelease Date: 2014-12-28
This undated GCHQ document provides guidance for analysts on how to handle encrypted data: see the Der Spiegel story Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security, 28 December 2014.
SECRET Crypt Ops Data StoreUserGuide Crypt Ops Datastore DataStore Rota: -Data Store to be reviewed weekly at the DataStore management meeting The Tasking Process Submitting a Ta...
DocumentRelease Date: 2014-12-13
This undated page taken from GCHQ’s internal GCWiki cites the codename LEGSPIN (highlighted) also found in an analysis of Regin malware: see the Intercept article Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco, 13 December 2014. gchq-stargate-cne-requirements
SECRET STRAP1 COMINT The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate content. For GCWiki help contact: webteam Support page STA...
DocumentRelease Date: 2015-05-05 Document Date: 2009-12-07
This GCHQ document from 7 December 2009 provides an assessment of current progress in speech to text technology from the agency’s Speech Technology Working Group: see the Intercept article The Computers are Listening: How the NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text, 5 May 2015.
UK SECRET STRAP1 B/7655BA/1400/00006/018/0 7 December 2009 SIRDCC Speech Technology WG assessment of current STT technology Security Service have asked the SIRDCC Speech Technology Worki...
DocumentRelease Date: 2016-01-29 Document Date: 2008-01-01
This GCHQ manual from 2008 explains how analysts would unscramble the video signals from Israeli drones: see the Intercept article Spies in the Sky: Israeli Drone Feeds Hacked by British and American Intellience, 29 January 2016.
SECRET ISUAV Video Descrambling Author: vereîon^ra Introduction Analogue video from Israeli UAVs has been intercepted in both clear (i.e. unencrypted) and scrambled (i.e. encrypted...
DocumentRelease Date: 2014-01-27 Document Date: 2010-05-28
Six slides from a 28 May 2010 GCHQ presentation on intercepting mobile phone data, describing the agency’s many tools for compromising individual handsets and weaknesses within national networks and international roaming exchanges (GRXs). Note that these are the first versions of these documents to be released online: see the Guardian article NSA and GCHQ target […]
SECRET STRAP 1 MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010 MORE - mobile technologies, networks, signals & locations FASTER - developments against new mobile internet applications BETTER - ...
DocumentRelease Date: 2015-08-03 Document Date: 2010-07-02
This page taken from a longer 2 July 2010 GCHQ report on the state of its COMSAT capabilities (against communications satellites) confirms that “NSA has historically been a large source of funding” for this aspect of the agency’s activies: see the Intercept article GCHQ and Me: My Life Unmasking British Eavesdroppers, 3 August 2015. Download […]
SECRET MTI/00001CPO/4521/S03006/000/07 TCP-MP69-STG-001 2 July 2010 I. BACKGROUND 5. GCHQ currently owns three sites that are involved in COMSAT access: CARBOY, SOUNDER and SNICK. Thes...
DocumentRelease Date: 2016-06-07 Document Date: 2010-02-12
This draft report from 12 February 2010, prepared by officials from the UK intelligence services for review by the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury is frank about the challenges brought about by bulk collection: see the Intercept article Facing Data Deluge, Secret U.K. Spying Report Warned of Intelligence Failure, 7 June 2016.
UK SECRET DRAFT The Digint Programme (DRAFT VERSION 0.11) The purpose of this document to provide background for HMT and the Cabinet Office on the Security Service's Digint Programme. [I...
DocumentRelease Date: 2018-01-19 Document Date: 2008-01-01
This extract from the January 2008 minutes of GCHQ’s Voice/Fax User Group (VFUG) discusses a November 2007 visit to NSA and being shown a version of Voice RT, which is described as a “one-stop shop” for voice-related insights: see the Intercept article Finding Your Voice, 19 January 2018.
SECRET STRAP1 a) Visit to R64, NSA and^^^^^^J from B14 visited our opposite numbers in R64 at NSA during the last week in November. The aim of the visit was threefold: i. to learn about t...