Title: Visit Precis: Sir Iain Lobban

Release Date: 2014-04-30

Document Date: 2013-04-01

Description: This internal NSA document from April 2013 gives background information to prepare for the then GCHQ Director’s visit on 30 April and 1 May; included topics include access to PRISM data, FLAME malware, Iran, Syria and Israel: see the Intercept article British Spy Chiefs Secretly Begged to Play in NSA’s Data Pools, 30 April 2014. […]

Document: TOPSECRET//SI//NOFORN

VISIT PRÉCIS

Sir Iain Lobban, KCMG, CB

Director, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

30 April 2013 - 1 May 2013

GEN A Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
GEN A Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830

Accompanying Senior: Mr. James M. Cusick, Director Foreign Affairs (DIRFA)

BACKGROUND: (U//FOUO) As General Alexander’s UK counterpart, Sir Iain has visited
NSA on several occasions as one would expect, both in his current position and previous ones.

Sir Iain most recently visited NSA on 27 March 2012, when he accompanied Air Chief Marshal
Sir Stuart Peach. That visit had a more defined purpose of introducing Sir Stuart to
USCYBERCOM and NSA leadership as the Commander of the UK’s newly-established Joint
Forces Command. This will be the first visit in some time that will allow the visitor to reconnect
with NSA Leadership on NSA/GCHQ matters.

PURPOSE OF THE VISIT: (U//FOUO) As the Director of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect
with NSA Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to ensure each partner is aware of the
other’s activities and future plans.

CDR/DCDR/DDIR GUIDANCE: (U) N/A

PREP SESSION GUIDANCE: (U//FOUO) NONE

NSA/CSS REQUESTED: (U//FOUO) NONE

CYBERCOM REQUESTED: (U//FOUO) NONE

KEY TOPIC AREAS:

(TS//SI//NF) FAD and SUSLOL are not aware of any particular issues that Sir Iain will want to
address. NSA leadership should still be aware of the following topics that may pertain to their
organizations or areas of responsibility, as the potential exists for them to be brought up by the
visitor:

- (TS//SI//NF) FAA 702 Data: Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner similar
to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish list and is something its leadership still
desires. NSA and SID leadership are well aware of GCHQ’s request for this data, and the
steps necessary for approval. NSA leadership could be asked whether we’re still
supportive of this initiative. On a related topic, progress continues on “Triage 2.0,”

GCHQ access to FAA 702 data under supervised conditions. The MOA is now back in

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated:20070108

Declassify On: 20380401

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GCHQ’s court awaiting signature. With that said, GCHQ seems less enthused about
Triage, perhaps in part because of the long steps necessary to gain approval. For
additional background about these topics, see the attached paper that Mr.

HHHHHHHHHHHIIB SID Associate Deputy Director, Counterterrorism
(ADD/CT) SIGINTAuthorities Lead, NSA/CSS Counterterrorism Mission Management
Center (CTMMC) prepared for D/DIR ’s April 2013 UK visit.

- (TS//SI//NF) UK Intelligence Community Oversight: GCHQ and its sister intelligence
agencies are challenged with their activities and operations being subject to increased
scrutiny and oversight from their government (and public). As a result, closer attention is
being paid to how UK-produced intelligence data is being used by NSA, and other
partners. It is possible that Sir Iain may ask about what safeguards NSA may be putting
in place to prevent UK data from being provided to others, the Israelis for instance, who
might use that intelligence to conduct lethal operations. For additional information about
this subject, and other UK Intelligence Community legal issues and legislation, see the
attached paper prepared by Mr. HHHHHHH Office of the General Council, London.

- (TS//SI//NF) Syria: Prime Minister Cameron continues to look to the UK security and
intelligence agencies for recommended courses of action to influence the outcome in
Syria, but to this point GCHQ has not offered much beyond messaging and limited online
effects operations. GCHQ’s ability to contribute significantly to the overall Syria SIGINT
effort is hampered by GCHQ’s limited resources. It should be noted that the UK
Intelligence Community is just as concerned about the end state of Syria’s chemical and
biological weapons as the U.S. Intelligence Community. Sir Iain may want to discuss
Syria’s use of chemical weapons and how the U.S. Government intends to react. For
more information about NSA’s posture against Syria, see attached Near East Division-
produced paper on Syria.

o (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Director Talking Points: Syria remains
locked in a protracted struggle, with both the opposition and the regime firmly
entrenched in their positions. Attempts to coalesce the opposition have moved
extremely slowly, while the regime has not in any way indicated that it would
willingly stand aside. Given this lack of movement in negotiations and the
stalemate on the ground, we anticipate the conflict will not be resolved in an
expedient manner.

o (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA continues to monitor the situation in
Syria from all angles, including from the viewpoint of the regional, international,
and radical actors. NSA remains concerned about chemical weapons security and
continues to monitor the situation closely, to the best of our ability.

- (TS//SI//NF) Iran: GCHQ and the UK Government remain concerned about events in
Iran and the possibility that tensions with the West or Israel could escalate. The visitor
may ask NSA and SID leadership to share their views on what is going to happen with

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated:20070108

Declassify On: 20380401

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Iran, to include potential Israeli response. For information about NSA’s posture against
Iran, see attached Iran Division produced paper on Iran.

o (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Director Talking Point: Emphasize that we have
successfully worked multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed
us to refine maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize
our target coverage. These jointly-worked events include the storming of the
British Embassy in Tehran, Iran’s discovery of FLAME, and support to
policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiations.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, GBR) Global Collaboration Environment (GCE): On 2 April
2013, SID Foreign Partner Strategist (FPS) Mr. ■HHH, held a discussion with
Mr. ■■■ (Head of Bilateral and Multilateral Relations, GCHQ International
Relations) to discuss the future of GCE in a post-Afghanistan era. GCE is the next
generation of PARTNERMALL (PMP) and should be the future partner collaboration
solution of choice. GCE expands the current single collaboration environment PMP
capability into a bilateral and multilateral model. The two discussed the benefits of NSA
and GCHQ having a united front in its dealings with the other foreign partners on this
issue. They also discussed the possibility of the UK hosting a permanent facility where
analysts from partner nations could be co-located, along with ways to better integrate
GCE into each partner’s analytic workflow. For information about this discussion, see
the attached paper prepared by SID’s Foreign Partner Strategist Office.

o (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Director Talking Points: Thank GCHQ for giving full
support to GCE, and for partnering with NSA to engage in synchronized
messaging to other organizations.

o (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Encourage GCHQ to host the permanent facility for the
joint SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) collaboration center, in order to maximize
the benefit for the Five Eyes partnership.

o (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Offer NSA’s assistance in finding good solutions for
incorporating GCE access into GCHQ’s analytic workflow. Encourage GCHQ to
engage with NSA’s TD on this subject.

KEY TAKEAWAYS: (U//FOUO) See above.

VISIT FORMAT: (U//FOUO) General Alexander will host a dinner in honor of Sir Iain at his
residence on 30 April 2013. The two directors will also have a one-on-one discussion on 1 May
2013. The remainder of Sir Iain’s agenda will involve NTOC and TAO tours/demos, along with
discussions with NSA Leadership, including Ms. Teresa H. Shea, SIGINT Director, Mrs. Debora
A. Plunkett, IAD DIR, Mr. Rajesh De, General Council, Mr. Wayne M. Murphy, D/DIR
Analysis and Production, Mr. D/DIR Data Acquisition Mrs. ■■

■■■ D/DIR NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC), Mr. Robert E. Joyce, CH

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated:20070108

Declassify On: 20380401

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Tailored Access Office, Mr. ■xxxxxxxxxxxx, Incoming SUSLOL, and Mr. ■HHH,

Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES).

PREVIOUS VISITS AND RESPECTIVE TOPICS: (U//FOUO) As General Alexander’s UK
counterpart, Sir Iain has visited NSA on several occasions, in both his current position and
previous ones. Sir Iain most recently visited NSA on 27 March 2012, when he accompanied Air
Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach. During that visit, Sir Iain met with General Alexander,

Mr. Inglis, and other NSA and USCYBERCOM leaders.

POTENTIAL LANDMINES: (TS//SI//NF) GCHQ has long advocated that it work with NSA
and the Israeli SIGINT Service (ISNU) in a trilateral arrangement in prosecuting the Iranian
target. SID policy has been opposed to such a blanket arrangement, and the specific trilateral
explained in the attached paper on Iran should not be interpreted as a broad change of approach.
In other areas, NSA and GCHQ have agreed to continue to share information gleaned from the
respective bilateral relationships with ISNU.

OTHER INFORMATION (GOOGLE SEARCH, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS,
INTERESTING FACTS, NCR/LNO ADVICE...) (U) NONE

RECENT PRESS INDICATIONS: (U) N/A

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

Dated:20070108

Declassify On: 20380401

TOPSECRET//SI //NOFORN

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