Title: SIGNIT Development Forum (SDF) Minutes

Release Date: 2015-03-10

Document Date: 2009-06-09

Description: These intenal NSA minutes from a meeting that took place on 8 June 2009 discuss GCSB activities and interoperability between NSA systems: see the New Zealand Herald article NZ’s spy reach stretches across globe, 11 March 2015.

Document: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

SIGINT Development Forum (SDF) Minutes
Location: NSA-W
Date: 8-9 June 2009

8 June 2009

Developments in SD - NSA

5 key imperatives for SSG:

Target trends - to include the percentage of budget which these efforts influence. Effort
is linked to the joint SSG/SINIO report on the top 13 technologies, the top 5 are now
being broken down into the level of effort being applied, what NSA’s capability against
them is and the degree of budget investment and impact. NSA are looking to improve
their ability to identify new technology trends, the CT product line is already engaged
and closely partnering with on this, but SSG is now engaging the wider product centres to
seek the top 2 technologies of interest seen in their domains. NSA POC is
@nsa.ic.gov), Chief Target Technology Trends Center (T3C)

Shaping - in this context NSA means increasing cross access coordination efforts. It was
highlighted that the definition of “Shaping” differs amongst the partners (CSEC and
GCSB have a narrower definition that is classified at a higher level and focused on
activities such as industry engagement and collection bending). NSA is working to
increase their focus on router ops, understanding EREPO and increasing CNE survey
efforts. NSA POC is__________ @nsa.ic.gov)

Pattern of life - increasing NSA capabilities in this realm, working to ensure NSA
developments in this realm are not made project dependent (ie. Spread algorithms across
tools/accesses). NSA also see PoL having CND applicability. Current focus includes:
travel, FTM, alternate ID, SNA and content mining. NSA POC is^^^^H
^^^B@nsa.ic.gov)

IP geolocation - working to broaden NSA geolocation strategy to cover IP, RF and GSM
realms. This imperative has been transitioned out as it’s now considered core business,
Convergence has taken it’s place in the top 5 imperatives. NSA POC is
@nsa.ic.gov), NAC TD

Convergence - particularly focused on the assessment of Convergence impact upon
Sigint and what Sigint should be concerned about. NSA POC is
^^^^[@nsa.ic.gov)

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20340601

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Human capitol - exploring how to train and maintain the NSA analytic workforce, to
include the exploration of certification levels and their associated assessment
mechanisms. NSA POC is (^^^B@nsa.ic.gov)

NB: ADD SD reports to NSA leadership quarterly to report on the above and be tasked
by leadership.

Other key issues on SSG’s radar for the next year:

Privacy issues - (which includes the issue of 2P auditing). explained that 2 years
ago the SID Director expressed concerns over NSA’s ability to provide oversight and
compliance on Sigint data access. It was determined that the Oversight & Compliance
team at NSA was under-resourced and overburdened. As a result, there is increasing
effort to scrutinize who, how and why users have access to NSA databases (to include the
skill level of analysts who get access). This effort is being worked across S1 and S2, with
increasing S3 involvement (as S3 elements do require access to Sigint databases).

Mission delegations are being reviewed more closely and NSA have found that these
delegations stretch beyond production centers to include the likes of RAD and ADET.

It was flagged by GCSB and DSD that there is no easy equivalent NSA TOPI to sponsor
and audit analyst accounts. CSEC indicated they had engaged NSA to discuss the
possibility of CSEC funding audit billets. This was initially shot down but has since come
back onto CSEC and NSA radars. DSD and GCSB mentioned they are engaging their
SUSLOs to explore new alternatives to this issue (eg. Use of spouses or interns). There
was some mention of AUS, CAN, GBR and NZL possibly also having to consider
implementing “super users”, whereby database accounts are limited to a subset of their
workforce and those users run queries for their counterparts.

CND - indicated that this will be a key area of focus and effort for SSG in the
coming year, particularly as USCYBERCOM is established. He anticipates there being
increasing outreach to key NSA CND elements and stakeholders to see where greater
SIGDEV support to CND can be provided.

Developments in SD - GCSB ■)

The key areas of SD focus for GCSB are:

Survey analysis and network analysis capability development - GCSB is establishing
their first Network Analysis team in October 2009, DSD’s will PCS to GCSB

for 2 years to lead this team. The new team will initially be focused on access
development and is aimed at proving the utility of Network Analysis such that a push can
be made for additional GCSB billets (which can then increase support to STATEROOM
and CNE realms)

Continued effort against the South Pacific region - GCSB’s access development
activities will be focused on the South Pacific region and entail close partnering and

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

engagement with DSD, NZSIS and ASIS. This is seen as a continuing high priority issue
given the increasing rollout of cable in the South Pacific region

SIGINT/IA cyber cooperation - GCSB will be running a one month project in Sept/Oct
2009 involving cooperation and fusing of effort between GCSB SIGINT and GCSB
Information Assurance on cyber topics (this effort will include a CSEC TDY).
believes the CND issue may have an added benefit of pushing the priority up on GCSB
cable access effort and capabilities

Auditing issue - indicated that 20% of GCSB’s analytic workforce does not have
accounts or access to key NSA databases. This is a particularly significant issue for
GCSB as they provide NSA with NZL data which they have traditionally accessed via
NSA tool/database interfaces (ie. GCSB analysts are unable to query or access NZL
data). GCSB are also working to gain connectivity to DSD XKEYSCORE (as a first step
towards connecting to other 2P XKs)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

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