Title: NSA intelligence relationship with Norway

Release Date: 2014-04-26

Document Date: 2013-04-17

Description: An internal NSA Information Paper dated 17 April 2013 that describes the current state of the relationship between NSA and the Norwegian intelligence service: see the Dagbladet article, NIS aquires supercomputer, 26 April 2014.


National Security Agency/Central 17 April 2013

Security Service

Information Paper

(S//REL TO USA, NOR) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Norway
(U) Introduction

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) The SIGINT relationship between the National Security
Agency (NSA) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) began informally in 1952,
and was formalized in 1954 when both services signed the Norway - United States of
America (NORUSA) SIGINT agreement. Subsequent additions included the exchange
of FISINT and Space Collection in 1963, ELINT in 1970, and PROFORMA and COMINT
Technical Extracts of Signals in 1994. While NIS produces all-source reports combining
SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, ACINT, RADINT and TELINT, the strength of the service
remains its SIGINT capabilities against principally Russian targets. Over time, the NIS
has expanded its customer base within the Norwegian government and has acquired
new systems that can access INMARSAT, FORNSAT and microwave transmissions.

This expansion has permitted NIS to respond to new national-level transnational
requirements specific to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental issues. NIS
has also deployed tactical intelligence systems and SIGINT personnel to support
Norwegian and coalition forces in Afghanistan.

(U) Key Issues

■ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) Modernization - NSA and NIS are beginning to
collaborate on modernizing the Norwegian SIGINT service’s end-to-end
collection and processing capabilities. The main focus will be to address a
request from the partner for advice on coping with the growing volumes of
SIGINT data they are able to access. The overarching goal of this interaction is to
maximize mission benefit of NIS accesses by enabling the partner to exploit
those accesses more effectively from an analytic perspective. NSA is prepared to
advise NIS on technology investments they can make over the next five years.
NIS has received a four-fold increase (approximately US$100M) in their budget
to support this effort.

■ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) On 7 March 2013, NSA and NIS completed their
annual Strategic Planning Conference. NIS specifically requested strategic
discussions on several technical issues including cable access, deployed
sensors, CLOUD computing and FORNSAT modernization. High level

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20340501


discussions were also held on Afghanistan, forensics, Human Language
Technology, Russia, and Weapons & Space. NIS was especially pleased with the
technical discussions as they are currently making significant financial
investments to modernize their SIGINT capabilities.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) What NSA Provides to Partner

Daily TS//SI-level counterterrorism (CT) reports shared multilaterally;
Freauen^xchanae^nechnicaMat^n^nalvti^xDertis^n CT targets,


threats to Norway’s national security;

Daily force protection support in Afghanistan and technical expertise to support
target development of Afghan insurgent targets;

Regular reporting on counter-proliferation
Ad-hoc reporting and analytic expertise on

Exchanges of reporting, tech data and analytic expertise on

Tech data and expertise on cryptanalytic topics of mutual interest; and
FORNSAT communications metadata

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) What Partner Provides to NSA

■ SIGINT analysis as well as geolocational and communications metadata specific
to Afghan targets of mutual interest (this analysis also supports Norwegian
Special Operations Forces (when deployed);

■ All-source analysis specific to Afghan targets of mutual interest. The analysis is
based on operations conducted jointly between Norway and local and/or coalition

■ Potential to leverage NIS FORNSAT capabilities to augment NSA collection
against high priority CP SIGINT targets;

■ Potential to leverage NIS unique access to SIGINT on high priority CT targets;

SIGINT reports on Russian civil targets of mutual targets, particularly Russian
energy policy;

FORNSAT communications metadata; and

(U) Success Stories

■ (S//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) NIS has been a model partner in the Afghanistan
SIGINT Coalition (AFSC) and a leader in the production of regional governance
reporting as part of the AFSC’s Analytic Division of Effort in Afghanistan. Norway
has led the entire AFSC partnership in reporting in support of the Analytic DOE
since its inception in October 2011. Overall, Norway has been responsible for
approximately 53% of the reporting on Afghan government targets from the




AFSC members, and 56% of the AFSC reporting that has been re-issued to U.S.

■ (TS//SI//RELTO USA, NOR) NIS revealed an organic Computer Network
Exploitation (CNE) capability to NSA in September 2011. In response, NSA
engaged NIS and gained its agreement to share reporting from Norway’s CNE
access. NSA is working to expand and deepen its intelligence exchange with
NIS, focusing on report sharing and target development on Russian political,
natural resources and energy issues, and including sharing of selected data from
NSA CNE collection.

■ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) NIS is in the process of acquiring STEELWINTER
(a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has entered into a
collaborative partnership with NSA’s Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services to
develop applications of mutual benefit.

■ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) NSA’s National Threat Operations Center (NTOC)
considers Norway one of its top two partners. NTOC has a direct line with our
NIS counterparts over which we collaborate on discovery and analytic issues.
The Norwegians have provided IP addresses, techniques, and tradecraft they
observe from foreign adversaries on Norwegian national networks. NTOC shared
its methodology to help the partner improve the discovery, characterization, and
attribution of the capabilities, activities, and intentions of malicious actors to
exploit or disrupt protected entity networks.

■ (TS//SI//NF) NIS is currently ranked among the top two foreign partners for

^ I ■ A ( 4 4 « * > ^ A l/N ^ ^ ■ • •

contributor to the FISINT mission, with many sole-source intercepts. Norwegian
collection represents approximately one-fifth of NSA’s overall space FIS

(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner

■ (U) None at this time


Prepared by: Name

Title: Country Desk way





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