Title: NSA Assistance to Japanese Directorate for SIGINT in Developing Capabilities to Provide SIGINT Support to CND
Release Date: 2017-04-24
Document Date: 2013-01-29
Description: This internal briefing dated 29 January 2013 provides talking points for the NSA Director on improving cooperation with Japan in the cyber realm : see the Intercept article Japan Made Secret Deals With The NSA That Expanded Global Surveillance, 24 April 2017.
(S//REL TO USA, JPN) Topic: NSA Assistance to Japanese Directorate for SIGINT in
Developing Capabilities to Provide SIGINT Support to CND.
(S//NF) The Japanese Directorate for SIGINT (DFS) has been tasked to start providing SIGINT
support to CND. They have approached NSA for help in developing such a capability. The
impetus for this comes from the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Organization (CIRO), which
has been designated the Japanese lead for cyber. I AD will need to engage CIRO and craft an
MOU covering responsibilities/agreements on both sides. ^^^^H|head of CIRO, visited
NSA on 10 Sep 2012 for cyberrelateddiscussions. Cyber was also a significant topic of
discussion during the visit of^^^^^^l^HDI^DFS^n November 2012 and other recent
senior Japanese visits. The major focus ol his delegation is cyber related.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, JPN) Recent Actions:
• At the June 2012 US-Japan Strategic Planning Conference (SPC) in Japan, we briefed the
DFS about Chinese cyber activities and on how we produce foreign intelligence on those
• DFS has already assigned two career SIGINT professionals to focus full-time on Chinese
• We provided DFS with a list of SIGINT selectors that we use to collect information about
Chinese cyber actors. DFS feedback states that these have so far not produced any useful
collection. We are discussing with the DFS ways to improve this.
• At the SPC, we also offered to assist DFS in identifying platform training which would
benefit their newly assigned cyber analysts.
• During his January 2013 visit to Japan, briefed both CIRO and the DFS
leadership on how we develop reportable SIGINT information on Chinese cyber
activities. Following the briefing to DFS, observed that he now
understands how his organization should tackle the task of SIGINT collection, analysis
and reporting on Chinese cyber actors.
(U) Talking Points:
• (U//FOUO) Director’s Talking Points:
o (U) Key Points:
■ (S//REL TO USA, JPN) Assure that we will do what we can to
support the DFS in standing up a SIGINT support to CND capability.
■ (S//REL TO USA, JPN) Solicit comments on Japan's cyber
architecture, organizations, and authorities and ask for feedback on
discussions held in Japan in January.
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Declassify On: 20380101
(S//NF) Potential Landmine: None.
(U) Date of Material: 29 January 2013
(U//FOUO) Originator: Mr
S2B Office of China and Korea,
(U//FOUO) Alt. POC
, Senior China Strategist and Mission Advisor,
Foreign Affairs Officer, S2B Office of China and
(U//FOUO) Classification Review by: