Title: CROSSHAIR — Foreign Partners Filling HF/DF Gaps for the US
Release Date: 2017-09-13
Document Date: 2005-02-24
Description: The U.S. closed a number of High Frequency Direction-Finding sensor sites in the 1990s. To ensure they're able to track signals in areas that had previously been covered by now-shuttered stations, the Signals Intelligence Directorate worked with Second and Third Party partners to share resources and establish a global direction-finding network.
Document: DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TCP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
(C) CROSSHAIR — Foreign Partners Filling HF/DF Gaps for the US
Run Date: 02/24/2005
A multinational effort for High Frequency Direction-Finding (HFDF) (C)
• Q: (TS//SI) What do these Third Party partners have in common?
Austria, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Israel, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Netherlands,
Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Taiwan
• A: They all participate in the CROSSHAIR program, enabling the US to maintain an HFDF
(U//FOUO) CROSSHAIR implementation occurred on 01 October 1993 and is the project name
(and subsequent name of the US HFDF network) for the consolidation of all US Service
Cryptologic Element (SCE) HFDF resources into a single DF Network managed by NSA. Prior to
CROSSHAIR, each of the military SCEs had its own DF resources. In fact, at some large field
sites (e.g, Mi saw’a . Hanza ). all three SCEs operated DF systems within their respective nets
(numerous field sites had two SCEs conducting HFDF operations). However, there was no
interoperability and each SCE was funded for DF separately (a waste of dollars and resources).
(C) In the early 1990s, the Terrestrial Overt-Transition Study looked at our big, fixed, field sites
throughout the world and decided that it was necessary to close some of them to eliminate
duplication and save money. About 25 field sites were closed, which meant that the HFDF
mission lost a great many opportunities to get the lines of bearings needed to hone in on
targets. Instead of, say, 10-12 sites providing lines of bearings, maybe one or two existed. The
office that is now SID's HF Mission Management organization (S33113) needed to find other
resources to do the same job.
(C) In fact, all of our Second Party partners were fulltime members in CROSSHAIR - Canada had
four sites, Great Britain had six, Australia and New Zealand each had one; however, there were
still uncovered areas all over the world, and it occurred to S33113 that Third Parties might be
able/willing to help out. They came to what is now FAD . talked with various country desk
officers to see which countries might be willing to get involved, and thus began the expansion of
the CROSSHAIR program. The network has grown to the point where there are even trilateral
arrangements whereby some of our Third Party partners exchange HFDF information with each
(C) The expanded CROSSHAIR has been so successful thatHHH^f chief of HF Mission
Management, said, "Without Third Parties,we probably wouloir^ave a worldwide US HFDF
CROSSHAIR HFDF Network
blue dot = US HFDF sensors; red dot = partners HFDF sensors.
(TS//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, and NZL)
(U) This article is reprinted from the February Foreign Affairs Digest
"(U//FOUO) SlDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DLsid commsl."
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TCP SECRET // SI/ TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR N2L
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 2CQ20108