Title: 1999 Agreement between the US and Israel

Release Date: 2014-08-04

Document Date: 1999-07-15

Description: This agreement, dated 15 July 1999, includes a preamble describing the development of signals intelligence cooperation between the US and Israel since the 1950s: see the Intercept article Cash, Weapons and Surveillance: the U.S. is a Key Party to Every Israeli Attack, 4 August 2014.

Document: TOP S E C R E T/HVCCO

1. (S) preamblei in 1968 President Johnson and Prime Minister
Eshkol agreed that an intelligence exchange would take place
between the United States and Israel. This understanding
resulted in an intelligence exchange arrangement between the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of Defense (DoD)
and.the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Israel
Defense Forces (IDF), known as the CYR Agreement. In 19BR the
CYR Agreement was adjusted, broadened, reinforced, and extended
and the new Agreement was named “ICE CASTLE". In 1996, the
agreement was updated and renamed "STONE RUBY."

Over the years the scope of the intelligence exchange developed
both in substance and in depth, contributing significantly to the
national security of the U.S. and Israel.

This revised Agreement gives expression to the developments in
the intelligence exchange relationship that have occurred since
its inception, and provides the means and procedures for the
continuation and enhancement of that exchange for the mutual
benefit of both countries.

All exchanges of military intelligence whether by meeting,
conference, ad hoc gatherings, or via any communications medium
between any DoD organization and any IDF organization, shall be
conducted under the auspices of this Agreement and shall be
subject to the policies and procedures contained herein.

Exchanges between DoD and IDF organizations involving only
signals intelligence have been upgraded to the TOP SECRET level.
All other intelligence exchanged will be at the SECRET level and
below. DIA and the DMI, as the parties to this Agreement,
represent DoD and the IDF, respectively, in carrying out its
provisions.

This Agreement supersedes the STONE RUBY Memorandum of Agreement
dated 19 August 1996. 2

2. (S) PURPOSE: In the spirit of defense cooperation between

the governments of Israel and the United States of America,
noting mutually beneficial intelligence exchange arrangements
that have taken place within that cooperation, and recognizing
the benefits from an exchange of intelligence in areas of mutual
interest, the parties to the Agreement enter into the following
Memorandum of Agreement on the exchange of intelligence.

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3. (S) SCOPE: The scope of this Agreement is defined in

Annex 1.

4. (S) OBJECTIVE: It is the objective of this Agreement to

establish the means and procedures by which intelligence is
exchanged between the parties in fulfillment of the scope of the
Agreement. This Agreement does not address contingencies for
combined intelligence cooperation. Combined intelligence
cooperation under contingency/crisis situations will be as
directed on a case-by-case basis by the respective national
command authorities.

5. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES! The parties to the Agreement shall:

a. Participate in military intelligence exchange conferences
and ad hoc meetings. The procedures concerning these exchanges
are contained in Annex 2 to this Agreement.

b. Participate in the combined exploitation of military
materiel and materiel having potential military uses as described
in Annex 3.

c. Honor written requests for intelligence information from
the respective intelligence agencies through each country's
defense attaches and/or liaison officers in accordance with the
disclosure policies of each country and procedures outlined in
Annex 4 to this Agreement.

d. Allow attache-to-analyst discussions on a face-to-face
basis within the scope of the Agreement and in accordance with
procedures at Annex 5 to this Agreement.

G. (TOP SECRET/HVCCO) SECURITY:

a. The existence of this Agreement is TOP SECRET/'HVCCO, and
the contents are TOP SECRET/HVCCO. The existence and terms of
this Agreement will not be disclosed to another nation without
the permission of both parties to the Agreement.

b. All classified information or material provided or
generated pursuant to this Agreement shall be. stored, handled,
transmitted, and safeguarded in accordance with the General

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Security of Military Information Agreement between Israel and the
United States of America, dated 10 December 1982, as amended, and
including the Industrial Security Annex thereto, of 3 March 1983
and shall be in conformance with the procedures contained in
Annex 6 to this Agreement.

c. In addition, all classified information or material
involving signals intelligence provided or generated pursuant to
this Agreement shall be stored, handled, transmitted, and
safeguarded in accordance with the "Guidelines for SIGINT
Coopération'' between the United States National Security Agency
and the Israeli SIGINT National Unit, dated 1989, as amended
November 1992.

7 . (C) INTERPRETATION: Any disagreement regarding the

interpretation or application of this Agreement will be resolved
by consultation between the parties and will not be referred to
an international tribunal or third party for settlement.

8. (C) DURATION OF the AGREEMENT: This Agreement will expire 20

years from the date it comes into force and it may be extended
for additional periods upon mutual Agreement of the parties. The
parties will review the terms of the Agreement every 5 years.

9. (C) FISCAL OBLIGATIONS: Each party will assume all costs it

incurs in carrying out this Agreement, including expenses for
transportation, lodging, and meals of its participants at the
conferences and special meetings provided for in annexes to this
Agreement. Other expenses related to hosting conferences and
special meetings, provided for in annexes to this Agreement, will
be borne by the hosting party. The obligations of each party are
subject to the availability of funds. Each party will notify the
other immediately if funds available to it are not sufficient to
carry out all the provisions of the Agreement.

10. upon the mutual Agreement of both parties. In accordance with
applicable laws, procedures, and regulations governing each party
additional annexes may be added, with the consent of both
parties, to cover areas of cooperation that may evolve in the
future. Requests for amendments to this Agreement will be

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referred to the Directorate for Policy Support in DIA and the
External Relations Department in the DMI.

11. (C) TERMINATION: The Agreement may be terminated at any

time by either party after a written notice is forwarded to the
other party.

12. (C) DATE AGREEMENT COMES INTO FORCE: This Agreement comes

into force on the date of last signature. It supersedes all
previous oral and written Agreements or understandings covering
the exchange of intelligence between the DIA and the DMI.

SIGNED SIGNED

Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

Director of Military

Intelligence
Israel Defense Forces

Date: 15 July 1999

Date: 15 July 1999

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r. :• '

ANNEX 1

SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT

(S) Within the disclosure policies of each party, the scope of
this Agreement shall encompass:

a. Military and military-political developments, to include
order of battle, in the countries of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran
and activities of the above countries within Lebanon; the
intentions of the above countries to use military force against
Israel or the United States; and the development of weapons of
mass destruction by and long-range delivery systems of Syria,
Iraq, Libya, and Iran.

b. International terrorism and radical Islamic organizations
and activities directed against the U.S. or Israel worldwide and
terrorist and terrorist-related issues in the Kiddle East.

Topics include indications and warning of terrorist operations
against U.S. and/or Israeli interests, information on activities
and capabilities of Middle Eastern State Sponsors of Terrorism,
and data on organizations that threaten U.S. and Israeli
interests, e.g.r organizations' capabilities, facilities, methods
of operation, and biographies. Intelligence on narcotics
activities by military or political-military figures and
organizations in Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq will be
exchanged where appropriate. __

c. Military and/or military intelligence activities
undertaken by the following countries in the geographic area of
the Middle East and North Africa which have an impact on the
mutual security interests of Israel and the United States:
Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldava, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Slovakia, former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania,
North Korea, the Peoples' Republic of China, and Vietnam,
hereafter referred to as Countries of Interest (COI). Also

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included are tactics and doctrine applicable to Middle Eastern
forces trained by the COI.

a. Characteristics of weaponry introduced into; or
developed, produced or upgraded within Syria, Iraq, Libya, or
Iran; or which jointly agreed intelligence indicates will be
introduced from the COI into Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq within
the next 4 years. Discussions on this will include sharing, on a
case-by-case basis, information on military production infra-
structures of the COIs. In each case the infrastructure to be
discussed must relate directly to specific weapon systems which
are mutually agreed upon to be introduced into Syria, Iraq,

Libya, or Iran. This will be in accordance with each country's
disclosure guidelines and with the provision that intelligence or
characteristics data provided by a third country will only be
shared if that country has expressly authorized release of the
information.

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ANNEX 2

MILITARY EXCHANGE CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS

1. (S) SCOPE: Within the scope of the disclosure policies of

their respective governments, the parties to the Agreement will
hold periodic military intelligence exchange conferences and
meetings on the subject areas contained in Annex 1.

2. {S} OBJECTIVE: The objective will be to enhance the
knowledge and understanding of the analysts of both parties,
within the scope of the Agreement as defined in Annex 1,
concerning threats and potential threats to the mutual security
interests of Israel and the United States.

3. (S) PROCEDURES FOR CONFERENCES:

a. Prior to the conference, each party will provide the
other a list of proposed topics for discussion. If both parties
agree to discuss a topic, each will ensure analysts having
substantive expertise in the topics will be members of the
delegation to the conference.

b. The site of the conference will alternate between Israel
arid the United States. The dates of the conference will be
determined by Agreement between the parties.

c. DIA will invite appropriate U.S- Unified Command J-2s and
Service Intelligence Chiefs to participate in the conference and
may also offer other DoD and U.S. government intelligence
community components the opportunity to participate. The DMT,
likewise and at its discretion, may offer an invitation to other
Israeli government intelligence agencies and components. The
defense attaches/liaison officers.-of both governments may also
attend.

d. Communications concerning the conference on the U.S. side
will be forwarded through the U.S. Defense Attache' Office/Defense
Intelligence Officex- in Tel Aviv to the DMI. Israeli responses
may be provided to the U.S. Defense Attache Office/Defense
Intelligence Officer in Tel Aviv or may be passed to the Israeli
Defense Attache Office in VJashington, D.C. for transmittal to
DIA. Israeli communications on the conferences will be forwarded

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ANNEX 3

FOREIGN MATERIEL EXPLOITATION

1. (S) SCOPE: Within the scope of the disclosure policies of

their respective governments, the parties agree to undertake the
combined exploitation of military materiel and materiel having
potential military use, by making such materiel available to each
other and by sharing the technical exploitation results. The
parties also agree to share, consistent with the national
disclosure policies of their governments, the results of foreign
materiel exploitation carried out on their own, when deemed of
mutual interest under the scope of the Agreement.

2. (S) PROCEDURES:

a. Either party may request foreign materiel from the other
or may offer foreign materiel to the other. The party requested
to furnish foreign materiel may, consistent with its laws and
regulations, provide it to the requesting party on a non-
reimbursable basis. Each request or offer will be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. Neither party is obligated to accept an
offer or to provide materiel in response to a request from the
other.

b. Information which may be transferred incident to materiel
transfers includes:

(1) Theoretical and practical findings derived from
analysis of the materiel.

(2) Technical documentation, regulatory guidance, and
other relevant documents.

c. Requests for and offers of foreign materiel for
exploitation will be passed through the defense attache of the
originating party to the other party.

d. Foreign materiel may only be provided, accepted, or
exchanged pursuant to the laws and regulations of both parties.
When one party provides the other foreign materiel for
exploitation purposes on a non-reimbursable basis, the materiel
will be returned to the providing party at the end of the

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examination unless it is previously agreed in writing to do
otherwise. The providing state will continue to be the owner of
the materiel and the exchange will be for technical examination
only.

e. The condition of the foreign materiel provided by one
party to the other party for exploitation on a nonreimbursable
basis, from the time of departure to the time of return by the
receiving party will be governed by the principle that items are
to be returned in the same condition, with allowance for fair
wear and tear, unless destructive tests are jointly decided.
Foreign materiel may be examined for an initial period of no more
than one year, after which it will be returned to the sending
party unless an extended period has been agreed to between the
parties.

f. Insofar as national laws and regulations permit, and in
any event to the extent provided by applicable international
Agreements, the parties will endeavor to ensure that identifiable
taxes, customs, duties, and similar charges are not imposed in
connection with this Agreement. The parties will administer all
taxes, customs, duties, and similar charges in the manner most
favorable to the satisfactory execution of the arrangements
described in this Agreement.

g. The Foreign Materiel Programs Office of DIA's Directorate
for Intelligence Production (DI) will be the Department of
Defense point of contact for foreign materiel transfers under
this Agreement. The head of the DMI External Relations
Department (ERD) will be the point of contact for the Israel
Defense Force. The USDAO Tel Aviv/Defense Intelligence Liaison
Officer and the Israeli Assistant Defense Attache in Washington
will kept informed of such transfers.

3. (S) SPECIAL MEETINGS/PROJECTS:

a. Either party may request a special meeting at any time to
discuss a specific topic that addresses an urgent or critical
aspect of the combined exploitation.

b. Special meetings will be held at a time and place
mutually agreeable to both parties. DIA may invite appropriate
Unified Command J-2s and U.S. Service Intelligence Production

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Center representatives to participate and may invite personnel
from U.S. scientific and technical intelligence production
centers and other intelligence agencies to attend. The DMI,
likewise and at its discretion, may invite personnel from Israeli
scientific and technical intelligence production centers and
other Israeli intelligence agencies to attend.

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ANNEX 4

WHITTEN REQUESTS

1. (S) SCOPE: It is recognized that intelligence exchanges

between the parties to this Agreement will occur throughout the
year and not be limited to scheduled conferences and meetings
only. The objective of this Annex is to clarify procedures to be
used by either party in submitting written requests to the other
party. Written requests will be limited to the scope in Annex 1
to this Agreement.

2. (S) PROCEDURES:

a. Israeli written requests for information from DIA will be
submitted by the Israeli Defense Attache or Assistant Defense
Attache to the DIA Foreign Liaison Office. This channel is to be
used to request information requiring research, not for
information that is time-sensitive.

b. DIA written requests may be forwarded through the U.S.
Defense Attache/DIA Intelligence Liaison Officer in Tel Aviv to
the DMI External Relations Department or through the Israeli
Defense Attache Office in Washington. Israeli written requests
may be forwarded through the Israeli Defense Attache to the DIA
Foreign Liaison Office or through the U.S. Defense Attache/DIA
Intelligence Liaison Officer in Tel Aviv.

c. It is considered appropriate that the defense attaches of
either party, during face-to-face meetings (see Annex 5), discuss
written questions with analysis personnel. If written requests
can be answered on the spot or with only minimal research, the
analyst will do so.f These requests requiring research will be
identified by the analyst to the attache, who will then direct
the queries to the DIA Foreign Liaison Office or the DMI External
Relations Department, respectively.

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ANNEX 5

ATTACHE-TO-ANALYST DISCUSSIONS

1. (S) SCOPE: The parties to this Agreement recognize crises

may occur at any time or occasions will arise requiring the
sharing of intelligence information on a face-to-face basis
within the disclosure policies of each party. The objective of
this Annex is to clarify the procedures to be used by the parties
to the Agreement in conducting these discussions. Discussions
will be limited to the scope defined at Annex 1.

2. {S) PROCEDURES:

a. This exchange will *be restricted to crisis and current
information, recognized as not fully evaluated intelligence
limited to the scope defined at Annex 1. Requests for
comprehensive information will be in the written form stipulated
in Annex 4 of this Agreement.

b. All routine, periodic requests, either written or
telephonic, for meetings by the Israeli Defense Attaches in
Washington with DTA Defense Intelligence Officer for Middle East
and South Asia or the Directorate for Intelligence, J-2 will be
made/addressed to the DIA Foreign Liaison Office, which will
arrange the meetings. All routine, periodic requests, either
written or telephonic, for meetings by the Israeli Defense
Attaches in Washington with DIA analysts in the DIA Directorate
for Intelligence Production will be made/addressed to the
International Programs and Mission Support Division, DI. The
defense attaches will provide an agenda in advance but. no later
than 18 hours before the proposed discussions, of items for
discussion. DIA is not obliged to accept additions or changes to
proposed agenda items less than 18 hours before the discussions.

Urgent requests outside normal working hours will be made
through the Duty Director, National Military Joint Intelligence
Center (NMJIC), directly. Requests for discussions or contacts
falling outside this Annex shall be referred to the Foreign
Liaison Office. Requests for visits which include any parties in
addition the Israeli Defense Attaches will be submitted in
writing to the Foreign Liaison Office.

c. All requests for meetings, either written or telephonic,

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by the U.S. Attaches and/or the DIA Liaison Officer in Tel Aviv
will be to the External Relations Department (ERD), which will
arrange the meeting(s) with appropriate elements of the DMI or in
the intelligence establishments of the Services (Army, Navy, Air
Force). U.S. Attaches and/or the DIA Liaison Officer will also
provide agenda items for discussion but no later than 18 hours
before the proposed discussions. The DMI is not obliged to
accept additions or changes to proposed agenda items less than 18
hours before the discussions. Requests for discussions or
contacts falling outside this Annex shall be referred to the
External Relations Department. Urgent requests outside normal
working hours will be made through the External Relations
Department duty officer. Requests to the DMI for visits which
include any parties in addition to the U.S. Defense Attache
and/or DIA Liaison Officer will be submitted in writing to the
External Relation Department.

d. The DIA Foreign Liaison Office and the DMI External
Relations Department will ensure, if possible, that analysts
having the necessary expertise to address items on the agendas
will be made available for the meetings conducted under the
provisions of paragraphs 2.b. and 2.c. above.

e. There will be no exchange of written information during
these face-to-face discussions, except as provided in Annex 4 of
this Agreement.

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ANNEX 6
SECURITY

1. (S) General

a. Classified information and material shall be transferred
only through official government-to-government channels or
through channels approved in writing by the parties to this
Agreement. Such information and material shall bear the levels of
classification, denote the country of origin, the conditions of
release, and the fact that the information relates to this
Agreement.

b. Each Party shall take all lawful steps available to it to
ensure that information provided or generated pursuant to this
Agreement is protected from further disclosure, except as
permitted by subparagraph l.f. below, unless the other party
consents to such disclosure. Accordingly, each party shall
ensure that:

(1) The recipient shall not release the classified
information to any government, national organization, or other
entity of a third party without the prior written consent of the
originating party,

(2) The recipient shall not use the classified
information for other than the purposes provided for in this
Agreement.

(3) The recipient party will afford the information a
degree of protection equivalent to that afforded it by the
originating party.

(4) Each party will provide receipts for all classified
documents or material received:

c. The parties shall investigate all cases in which it is
known or where there are grounds for suspecting that classified
information or material provided or generated pursuant to this
Agreement has been lost or disclosed to unauthorized persons.

Each party also shall promptly and fully inform the other party
of the details of any such occurrences, of the final results of
the investigation, and of the corrective action taken to preclude

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recurrences.

d. Contractors, prospective contractors, or subcontractors
which are determined by either party to be under financial,
administrative, policy or management control of nationals or
entities of a third party, may participate in a contract or
subcontract requiring access to classified information, provided
or generated pursuant to this Agreement, only with prior written
approval of the other party.

e. For any facility wherein classified information or
material is to be used, the responsible party shall approve the
appointment of a person or persons to exercise effectively the
responsibilities for safeguarding at such facility the
information or material pertaining to this Agreement. These
officials shall be responsible for limiting access to classified
information or material involved in this Agreement to those
persons who have been properly approved for access and have a
need-to-know.

f. Each party shall ensure that access to the classified
information is limited to those persons who possess requisite
security clearances and have a specific need for access to the
information.

g. Information or material provided or generated
pursuant to this Agreement may be classified as high as TOP
SECRET for information involving signals intelligence and SECRET
for all other classified information.

h. Each party will permit security experts of the other
party to make periodic visits, when it is mutually convenient,
for discussing and observing its ^procedures and facilities for
the protection of classified information furnished to it by the
other party.

i. The unclassified nickname of this program is MONARCH
GATE. This nickname will be changed periodically to protect the
security of the arrangement.

j. The security provisions of this KOA will continue to have
effect after termination as if there had been no termination.

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2. (S) Visits to Establishments :

a. Each party shall permit visits to its government's
establishments, agencies, and laboratories and contractor
industrial facilities by employees of the other party or by
employees of the other party's contractors, provided that the
visit is authorized by both parties and the employees have
appropriate security clearances and a need-to-know.

b. All visiting personnel shall be required to comply with
security regulations of the host party. Any information disclosed
or made available to visitors shall be treated as if supplied to
the Party sponsoring the visiting personnel, and shall be subject
to the provisions of this Agreement.

c. Requests for visits by personnel of one party to a
facility of the other party shall be coordinated through official
channels, and shall conform with the established visit procedures
of the host country.

d. Lists of personnel of each party required to visit, on a
continuing basis, facilities of the other party, shall be
submitted through official channels in accordance with Recurring
International Visit Procedures.

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